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Table 1: Definitions of OBC and of other closely related phenomena
Source	Definition
Alonso-Rasgado et al. (2004)	“In the case of functional products, the customer pays only for a functional performance and does not buy the hardware... Since the customer pays only for the function...” (p. 537)
Kim et al. (2007)	“‘The essence of Performance Based Logistics is buying performance outcomes, not the individual parts and repair actions...” (p. 1843/1844)
Ng et al. (2009)	“[OBC] is a contracting mechanism that allows the customer to pay only when the firm has delivered outcomes, rather than merely activities and tasks. If one considers the famous quote from Levitt where ‘the customer really doesn’t want a drilling machine, he wants a hole-in-the-wall’, outcome-based contracts considers the possibility of customers paying only for holes in walls...In essence, outcome-based contracts drives home the concept of value- in-use, where value is defined as the benefit the customer obtains through use...” (p. 377)“In short, the buyer purchases the result of the product used (utilisation of service or performance outcomes) and not ownership of the product.” (p. 380)
Kim et al. (2010)	“Under PBC, compensation to a supplier is based on realized service outcomes such as equipment uptime or response time that are directly related to the value created by the customer through the operation of the system.” (p. 1552)
Hypko et al. (2010a)	“...the basic idea of PBC is that the customer purchases performance instead of the capital goods themselves.” (p. 648)
Ng and Nudurupati (2010)	 “OBC is a contracting mechanism that allows the customer to pay only when the firm has delivered outcomes, rather than for merely activities and tasks. OBC focuses on achieving required outcomes rather than performing to a set of prescribed specifications. In short, the buyer purchases the result of the product used (utilization of service or outcome) and not ownership of the product.” (p. 659)
Datta and Roy (2011)	“The performance-based contracting tends to focus on achieving a required outcome rather than a contract for the supply of a set of prescribed specifications. Thus, the buyer purchases the result of product use not ownership of the product... Performance-based contracts are an example of result-oriented industrial PSS.” (p. 583)
Guajardo et al. (2012)	“a new form of a support contract has emerged in recent years: performance-based contracts (PBC)...a supplier is paid based on the realized outcome of customer value.” (p. 961)
Kleemann and Essig (2013)	“There, the buyers no longer specify the individual components of a solution (e.g. a machine and related services) but rather the desired outcome (as the value expected from the solution), whereas the suppliers’ compensation is tied to successfully achieving this outcome.” (p. 185) 
Ng et al. (2013)	“[OBC] based on the outcome of such activities in continual use situations i.e., the number of hours of engine in the air. This is analogous to the well-known story in marketing of being paid for holes-in-walls, rather than for the maintenance, repair and upkeep of the drill.” (p. 731)
Van Ostaeyen et al. (2013)	“In a result-oriented PSS the product’s functional results are sold, that directly fulfil customer needs (type 3).”
Holmbom et al. (2014)	“PBL can be viewed as a result-oriented PSS...” (p. 960)
Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015)	“PBC can be briefly defined as the contractual approach of tying at least a portion of supplier payment to performance. The key characteristic of PBC is an emphasis on specification and evaluation of outputs or outcomes rather than required inputs, activities or processes.” (p. 3505)
Böhm et al. (2016)	“The essence of outcome-based contracting is the buying of relevant business outcomes rather than resources (such as spare parts or repair actions) required for their provision.” (p. 129)
Essig et al. (2016)	“PBC is defined as a contract which provides incentives for business outcomes. This means that a service provider is compensated according to the contribution made to the business results of the service buyer and pricing depends (at least to a certain extend) on the service performance level that is actually rendered.” (p. 5/6)
Liinamaa et al. (2016)	“PBC ‘is a results-oriented contracting method that focuses on the outputs, quality, or outcomes that may tie at least a portion of a contractor's payment, contract extensions, or contract renewals to the achievement of specific, measurable performance standards and requirements.’” (p. 40)
Batista et al. (2017)	“Such outcome-based contracts focus on achieving required outcomes rather than meeting a set of prescribed service levels.” (p. 133)“The service outcomes can be specified very broadly in terms of results, i.e. outcomes resulting from use...” (p. 134)
Visnjic et al. (2017)	“The outcome-based contracts include guaranteeing to deliver specific outcomes required by the customer and often involve combining diverse products and services to deliver the outcome.” (p. 169)
Hou and Neely (2018)	“we define an OBC as ‘an agreement between the provider and the customer that the provider provides total solutions and is paid based on the outcomes of the solutions or the outcomes of customer value in a continual use situation’...” (p. 2)
Visnjic et al. (2018)	“Outcome delivery entails offering guarantees to deliver specific outcomes required by the customer...” (p. 2)




Table 2: OBC – the essence
Source	Essence
Kim et al. (2010)	“one of the principal motivations for the customer to adopt PBC is to translate the risk of output uncertainty to the supplier in the form of contract payment uncertainty.” (p. 1552)
Hypko et al. (2010b)	“A customer profits by transferring risks to the performance provider...” (p. 476)
Ng and Nudurupati (2010)	 “Under OBCs, there are important differences in terms of risks and responsibilities between supplier and customer. For example, suppliers tend to have full responsibilities for performance, including the transfer of the risk for investments, ownership, maintenance, utilized capability, recycling and re-sales.” (p. 660)
Datta and Roy (2011)	“Under performance-based contracts suppliers have full responsibilities for performance.” (p. 583)
Ng et al. (2013)	“OBC puts the risk of delivering outcomes primarily on the firm, and secondarily on the customer.” (p. 733)
Holmbom et al. (2014)	“PBL transfers the service responsibility for a system from the customer to the supplier, i.e. the system manufacturer.” (p. 970)
Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015)	“A central feature of PBC is the transfer of risk to the supplier, since its reward is tied to performance achievement.” (p. 3509)
Böhm et al. (2016)	“OBCs tend to imply a shift of risk away from the buyer toward the seller.” (p. 129)
Visnjic et al. (2017)	“An outcome business model means that the provider will charge for the performance delivered rather than the product–service system that delivers the performance... As a result of doing this, the provider is effectively accepting the risk related to the performance of the product–service system... Hitachi Rail’s project manager argued that managing and mitigating risk related to performance becomes a crucial capability of the manufacturing firm that steps into the provision of outcome-based contracts.” (p. 177)




Table 3: Cases of OBC and of other closely related phenomena
Source	Description of case studies
Ng et al. (2009)	Investigates OBCs by two defence firms for two types of equipment, a fighter jet and a missile system. Both OBCs are based on a service contract that delivers the outcome of availability. No specific details about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.) are provided.
Hypko et al. (2010a)	Apply their conceptual model of PBC on the case of Eisenmann (the service provider), a German machinery and equipment manufacturer, and the car manufacturer Ford (the customer). The information about the case study is mostly gathered from commercial publications. In this PBC the service provider guarantees the customer an equipment availability of 98.5 percent. 
Ng and Nudurupati (2010)	Analyses two OBC defence contracts between the service firms and the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), which are based on a type of outcome-based contract that delivers the aircraft flying hours and missile system availability as an outcome of the contracts. No specific details about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.) are provided.
Datta and Roy (2011)	Two performance-based service contracts from defence sectors are investigated. The contactors are manufacturing-oriented organisations and they both provide availability service contracts. One contract is for weapons systems service in the army and the other is for fighter aircraft service within the air force. No specific details about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.) are provided. 
Lim et al. (2012)	Proposes a structured tool called the PSS Board to visualize the PSS process. It uses PSS cases identified in the literature to test the tool. 181 PSS cases were identified and then analyzed with the PSS Board. Among the 181 cases, 123 belong to the product-oriented PSS type, 35 belong to use-oriented, and the remaining 23 cases belong to the result-oriented PSS type. The cases were collected through various sources, including journal articles and books, conference proceedings, and Internet sources (blogs, news, and websites of PSS-related organizations. Unfortunately, no further details about any of the cases are provided.
Kleemann and Essig (2013)	Investigates five PBC cases with four cases from aerospace and defence and one from capital equipment. The information about the case studies is gathered from various publications. No specific details about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.) are provided. Apart from the case of capital equipment, all other case studies are availability-based service contracts. In the case of capital equipment, the provider is paid a fixed fee per unit of production output.  
Ng et al. (2013)	Investigates OBCs by two defence firms. The outcomes were the availability of two types of equipment; a fighter jet and a missile system. No specific details about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.) are provided.
Liinamaa et al. (2016)	Report findings from a case study of a PBC of a company that is a division of a global logistics equipment manufacturer. No specific details either about the case study company (e.g. name, etc.) or performance contract are provided.
Batista et al. (2017)	Investigates two OBCs where the studied organizations are two manufacturers of fast jet aircraft and engines in the military aviation and defence industry. The service contract specifies expected outcomes in terms of availability of aircrafts and related engines and mission systems. No specific details about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.) are provided.
Visnjic et al. (2017)	Investigates four OBCs. Two outcome providers are from the train sector, Hitachi Rail and Bombardier, and the other two are from the engineering goods sector, Caterpillar and Rolls Royce. Bombardier guarantees availability and reliability of the trains, which is almost identical with the case of Hitachi Rail where the operator pays a daily usage charge (availability, reliability and cleanliness). Caterpillar guarantees costs per operating hour of equipment, which include all maintenance and repair activity, as well as a guarantee that the equipment will be available. The case of Rolls-Royce investigates Total Care, which covers operational, maintenance and administrative support and risk. 
Hou and Neely (2018)	Investigates three companies that provide OBCs. Companies are named A, B, and C, hence no specific details are provided about the case study companies (e.g. name, etc.). Company A is a world leading producer of aero engines; Company B is a major player in the defence industry and Company C is a publishing and education company. The only description of services provided is a remark that all three companies are known for their outcome-based contracting models.




Table 4: Accounts of PBTH depicting it as the case of eOBC type
Source	Case description
Baines et al. (2007)	 “rather than transferring ownership of the gas turbine engine to the airline, Rolls-Royce (R-R) deliver ‘power-by-the-hour’.” (p. 1543) 
Neely (2008)	“Rolls-Royce Aerospace no longer simply sells aero engines. Now it offers a total care package, where customers buy the capability the engines deliver – ‘power by the hour’.” (p. 104)  
Ng et al. (2009)	“Outcome-based contracting, or its narrower equivalent of performance-based contracting, is a contracting mechanism that allows the customer to pay only when the firm has delivered outcomes, rather than merely activities and tasks. If one considers the famous quote from Levitt where ‘the customer really doesn’t want a drilling machine, he wants a hole-in-the-wall’, outcome-based contracts considers the possibility of customers paying only for holes in walls, when buying a drill (Levitt, 1972). This is the case for Rolls Royce ‘Power-by-the-hour’ contracting for the service and support of their engines, where the continuous maintenance and servicing of the engine is not paid according to the spares, repairs or activities rendered to the customer, but by how many hours the customer obtains power from the engine.” (p. 377)
Ng et al. (2013)	“With outcome-based contracts such as Rolls-Royce's ‘Power-by-the-hour’, the firm is paid not according to its service activities such as material and repairs, but based on the outcome of such activities in continual use situations i.e., the number of hours of engine in the air. This is analogous to the well-known story in marketing of being paid for holes-in-walls, rather than for the maintenance, repair and upkeep of the drill (Levitt, 1960).” (p. 731)
Gaiardelli et al. (2014)	“With the ‘Total Care package’ service, Rolls-Royce Aerospace Plc retains the ownership of the gas turbine engine instead of transferring it to the airline companies to deliver ‘power-by-the-hour’.” (p. 515)
Barrett et al. (2015)	“Instead of simply selling engines to their customers (e.g., airlines), Rolls Royce developed a product–service system (Neely 2008) in which they manufactured and retained ownership of the engines and contracted to customers a managed service around a new business model of “power by the hour.” Simply put, the customer no longer buys the engine as a product but the power the engine delivers.” (p. 137)
Ostrom et al. (2015)	 “Rolls-Royce has moved from the selling of aeroengines to a service led business that delivers power by the hour to many of its customers. The customer buys the power delivered by the engine, and Rolls-Royce provides all the required support.” (p. 134) 




Table 5: Accounts of PBTH depicting it as the case of aOBC type
Source	Case description
Baines et al. (2009)	They define RR’s PBTH as (p. 560) “guaranteed flying hours for aero engines”.
Johnstone et al. (2009)	The define PBTH as the case where (p. 525) “the customer pays to use the asset, and in return the manufacturer provides the availability of the asset.”  
Nordin and Kowalkowski (2010)	“For example, an aircraft operator buying a power by the hour solution from Rolls-Royce does not have to be concerned about the availability of aircraft, and can instead focus on the operations enabled by the solution.” (p. 452)
Smith (2013)	This is probably the most in-depth case study of RR. It is based on the analysis and synthesis of both archival material and interviews from both public and private domains. The study shows that PBTH first originated in RR and is linked to their contract with the US Navy from 2003. This contract was about (p. 999) ”the provision of maintenance and logistical support for the Rolls-Royce Turbomeca F405 Adour engines that powered the navy’s 200-strong fleet of Boeing/BAE Systems T-45 Goshawk advanced naval jet trainer aircraft.” The contract stipulated that RR was to receive a fixed price for each hour the engines were in the air and the performance was to be measured (p. 999) “almost exclusively against the fleet metric of providing a minimum level of ready-for-issue (RFI) engine availability”. Up to that point the RFI engine availability for the T-45 fleet averaged 70% and RR guaranteed to improve that to 80%. 
Parida et al. (2014)	They say that in PBTH by RR (p. 47) ”airlines pay for an engine’s operation (that is, hours of operation); maintenance and other services are provided as needed to ensure the specified hours of availability.”
Porter and Heppelmann (2015)	They refer to PBTH by RR as a pioneering model in which the company offers a product as a service (p. 105) “in which airlines pay for the time jet engines are used in flight, rather than a fixed price plus charges for maintenance and repairs.”
Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015)	They define PBTH as a (p. 3505) “business model where the company is paid for providing aero engine maintenance services based on engine availability (flight hours).”
Böhm et al. (2016)	“The most prominent example for OBCs based on availability (aOBCs) comes from the airline industry where Rolls Royce invented its ‘Power-by-the-Hour’ offering as early as the 1980s. Rather than charging its customers for the jet engine and the time and material needed for service and repair, Rolls Royce is being paid for the number of hours that its jet engines are operating in the air.” (p. 129)
Essig et al. (2016)	“For instance, the aero-engine manufacturer Rolls Royce offers not only aircraft engines to its customers, but also earns revenues from providing ‘total care’ solutions through ‘power by the hour’, offering services throughout an engine's lifecycle to ensure that customers pay for a product in use.” (p. 6)




